Egypt
is one of Israel's most powerful neighbors. Initially hostile to Israel, the two
countries have been at peace for nearly 40 years. Following the 1973 Yom Kippur
war, the 1978 Camp David Peace Accords between Israel and Egypt established
guidelines for what Egypt could do in the Sinai Peninsula in a bid to keep the
peace. Strategically, the peace agreement made the peninsula a buffer between
Israel and Egypt. It permitted only enough forces in Sinai to enforce security.
The agreement divided the Sinai Peninsula into four zones of increasing
neutrality. Egypt is allowed an entire mechanized or infantry division in Zone
A, which abuts the Suez Canal. In Zone B, its armed presence is limited to
municipal police and border patrol. 1,600 international peacekeepers are spread
out across 32 bases in the east of Zone C, and Israel is allowed a limited
presence in Zone D.
Periodically,
Israel allows Egypt to increase the number of troops east of Zone A for
temporary missions with goals like combating militants and criminal smugglers.
In 2011, Israel allowed Egypt to send 2,500 troops and 250 armored personnel
carriers into the normally demilitarized zones B and C as part of Operation
Eagle, a mission to provide security during the power transition from
then-recently fallen Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Operation Eagle was
joined by Operation Sinai, which came in response to a militant attack against
an Egyptian border post Aug. 5 that killed 16 border guards.
Together,
the two operations increased the total troop count by more than 2,500 -- the
exact troop count of Operation Sinai was in the low hundreds -- added 80
vehicles and, with Israeli Cabinet approval, at least two attack helicopters.
Egypt also was allowed to deploy armed fighter jets to El Arish to assist its
ground forces in Sinai. Significantly, Israel approved all of these deployments,
which are monitored by the 1,600 foreign troops that make up the U.N.
Multinational Force and Observers stationed throughout Zone C. Israel did so
because it is not in its interest to have unrest in Sinai, whether political
protests or militant violence.
Much of the previous militant violence on
the Sinai Peninsula has been directed against Israel or Israeli tourists at
Sinai beach resorts. Such violence continues, as attested by the four rockets
fired at southern Israel from the border town of Rafah on Nov. 14 shortly before
Israel announced it had killed Ahmed Jaabari. Like Gaza militants, Egyptian
militants are believed to possess Qassam and Grad rockets. Israel is content to
allow Egypt to secure Sinai to eradicate these threats.
Egypt's expanded force structure in Sinai is designed to deny militants
sanctuary by bringing more force to bear than the municipal police alone can
provide. Many of the new forces are stationed in the northeast of Sinai along
the Egyptian border with Gaza. The official crossing at Rafah and the many
illegal tunnels linking Gaza to Egypt together serve as a significant smuggling
corridor along which people, supplies and contraband like drugs and weapons
move. Egyptian soldiers have set up roadblocks and checkpoints to monitor and
inspect traffic transiting the Sinai Peninsula to counter this smuggling. Egypt
has an interest in limiting migrants moving between Egypt and Gaza, as Egypt
fears the risk of instability from taking on too many Palestinian refugees. They
also fear Israeli retaliation against militants in the Sinai Peninsula should
Israel decide Sinai was becoming a militant haven: The Egyptian military has no
interest in giving Israel a reason to become involved in Sinai.
The
number of troops Egypt has in the Sinai Peninsula now does not pose a direct
threat to Israel. If Israel in fact viewed the Egyptian military presence as a
threat, it would likely ask Egypt to draw down the expanded troop presence. In
fact, the biggest threat the Egyptian military could pose to Israel would be by
becoming less involved in Sinai.
Unlike during Operation Cast Lead in
2008, when Egyptian border guards kept the Rafah border crossing closed and even
engaged in skirmishes with the Palestinians, Egypt announced Nov. 15 that it
would open the border crossing to allow injured persons to seek medical
attention in El Arish. It reversed course and closed the border Nov. 16,
reflecting the limit on Egyptian humanitarian sentiments when it comes to Rafah
and taking into account Egypt's fear of a wave of refugees and militants seeking
sanctuary.
If Egypt changes course from 2008 and does not keep the
border closed during a ground invasion of Gaza, Israel would have to send troops
to the Philadelphi route in Gaza along the border with Egypt to cut the
Palestinian territory off from Egypt. This would put Israeli and Egyptian troops
closer than they have been for decades, heightening the risks for both sides.
The Rafah Crossing will illustrate Egypt's thinking with regard to the
current Israel-Gaza conflict. If Egypt allows the Rafah Crossing to stay open,
and especially if it leaves the border open if the fighting in Gaza escalates,
Egypt would have decided to oppose Israel, even though it would also be going
against its interest to avoid a wave of refugees. Any evidence of Egyptian
noncompliance to an Israeli request to draw down the added troops would even
more clearly show a rift between the two regional powers.
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